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Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc. v. United States, 841 F.3d 556 (2d 
Cir. 2016) 
 
Kirsa Shelkey 
 
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1935 is the proper avenue for 
Tribes pursuing restoration of their historic trust lands. The Oneida Indian 
Nation of New York long sought to reassert tribal jurisdiction over its 
historic homeland in Central New York. These efforts were largely 
unsuccessful until 2008 when the United States took 13,000 acres of this 
historic homeland into trust on behalf of the Tribe under the Indian 
Reorganization Act. This case affirms the federal government’s plenary 
powers over Indian Tribes, and that neither state sovereignty principles, 
nor the Enclave Clause upset that authority.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Oneida Indian Nation of New York’s (“Tribe”) aboriginal 
homeland once covered six million acres across New York.1 In 1788, the 
Tribe ceded all but a 300,000 acre reservation (“Reservation”) to New 
York State (“State”) in the Treaty of Fort Schuyler (“Treaty I”).2 Allotment 
Era policies and criminal purchases vastly reduced the Tribe’s jurisdiction 
over reserved and historic homelands.3 Although the Tribe began 
repurchasing lost reservation lands in the 1990’s, those lands remained 
under State jurisdiction.4 Following Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”) 
procedure, the Tribe petitioned the United States Department of the 
Interior (“DOI”) to take a portion of its lost lands into trust.5 In 2008, the 
DOI complied and restored 13,000 acres to tribal jurisdiction.6  
Two towns, a civic organization, and residents of the newly 
established trust lands (“Plaintiffs”) quickly challenged the DOI’s land-
into-trust determination.7 Invoking federal jurisdiction pursuant to the 
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), Plaintiffs argued acquiring land 
in trust for the Tribe exceeded constitutional federal power by infringing 
on state sovereignty, as well as violating the Constitution’s Enclave 
Clause.8 Plaintiffs further challenged the DOI’s interpretation of “tribe” 
and “Indians” pursuant to the IRA and Indian Land Consolidation Act 
(“ILCA”), arguing that the Tribe met neither definition.9 The court 
rejected each of these arguments, holding that neither principles of state 
                                                          
1.  Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc. v. United States, 841 F.3d 556, 
562 (2d Cir. 2016). 
2.  Id.  
3.  Id. at 562-63. 
4.  Id. at 563. 
5.  Id. at 560. 
6. Id.  
7.  Id.  
8.  Id. at 578. 
9.  Id. at 572. 
sovereignty, nor the Enclave Clause barred the DOI’s plenary authority to 
take land into trust on behalf of the Tribe under the IRA.10 Further, the 
court upheld the DOI’s interpretation that the Tribe became eligible to 
have land taken into trust on its behalf under the IRA in 1983, and that the 
DOI had statutory authority to take land into trust for the Tribe under  
ILCA.11  
 
III.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Tribe’s relationship with the State is long, complex, and 
tenuous.12 Beginning in the Allotment Era, Congress sought to “extinguish 
tribal sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries, and force the assimilation 
of Indians into society at large.”13 Through unwise and even fraudulently 
procured deals, many Indians quickly lost their allotments.14 Although the 
Non-Intercourse Act of 1790 prohibited selling Tribal land without federal 
consent, and the 1794 Treaty of Canandaiua acknowledged Treaty I’s “free 
use and enjoyment” of the Reservation, the State continued to buy 
Reservation lands.15 By 1920, tribal members owned only 32 acres of the 
Reservation’s original 300,000.16 However, the Reservation remained 
established.17 
Indian policy abruptly changed course in 1934 with passage of the 
IRA, which repudiated Allotment Era policy and sought to restore or 
replace Indian lands and related economic opportunities lost during 
allotment.18 Under § 5, the IRA authorized the “Secretary of the Interior . 
. . to acquire land and other property interests ‘within or without existing 
reservations… for the purpose of providing land for Indians.’”19 The lands 
were then held by the “United States in trust for the Indian tribe,” and not 
subject to State taxation, zoning laws, civil or criminal jurisdiction without 
tribal consent.20 The tribes could, however, opt out of IRA provisions by 
majority vote, which the Tribe did in 1936.21 In 1983, at the Tribe’s 
request, Congress overrode the Tribe’s opt out vote under ILCA.22 
The Tribe repurchased former Reservation lands throughout the 
1990’s, assuming that the properties were exempt from local property 
taxes because of their former Reservation status.23 After the Tribe opened 
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the Turning Stone Resort Casino (“Casino”) on one of the newly acquired 
properties and continued to default on its property tax payments, the Town 
of Sherrill filed suit to evict the Tribe from lands within the Town’s 
boundaries.24 While the lower courts agreed that the Tribe’s newly 
acquired  land was exempt from local property taxes, the United States 
Supreme Court reversed.25 The Court held that “equitable considerations 
precluded restoration of the Tribe’s sovereignty over land since purchased 
on the market.”26 However, the Court suggested that § 5 of the IRA was 
the Tribe’s “proper avenue . . . to reestablish sovereign authority over 
territory last held … 200 years ago.”27 
Almost immediately, the Tribe petitioned the DOI to take 17,000 
acres of tribally-owned land into trust on its behalf.28 In 2008, after finding 
the land-into-trust decision necessary to support tribal self-determination, 
tribal housing and economic development, the Secretary of the Interior 
agreed to take 13,000 acres of land into trust on behalf of the Tribe.29 
While the Secretary acknowledged the potential negative effects on the 
State, she concluded that those effects did not warrant land-into-trust 
denial.30 Plaintiffs filed suit in 2008.  
 
IV.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 While Plaintiffs’ challenges were still pending, the Supreme Court 
held in Carcieri v. Salazar that only tribes under federal jurisdiction in 
1934, the year Congress passed the IRA, were eligible to opt out of IRA 
procedures.31 The district court remanded to the DOI, which determined 
that the Tribe was under federal jurisdiction as of 1934.32 The district court 
then granted the government’s motion for summary judgement, finding 
that the federal government acted within its powers under the IRA.33 The 
State appealed.34 
 
V. ANALYSIS 
 
A. Standing 
As a threshold matter, the government contended that Plaintiffs 
lacked standing, because the Casino upon which the State asserted its 
harms would operate lawfully regardless of litigation. The court 
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disagreed.35 The court determined that Plaintiffs’ challenge could impact 
the Casino’s lawful operation, in that if the land-into-trust decision were 
overturned, the Tribe could no longer assert jurisdiction over the Casino.36 
Thus, Plaintiffs had standing and the court considered the rest of the case 
on its merits.37  
 
B.  Constitutionality of Land into-Trust Procedures 
 
Plaintiffs’ primary contention was that the federal government 
lacks constitutional authority to take land into trust on behalf of the 
Tribe.38 They first argued that because the land-into-trust action was 
entirely intra-state it did not trigger Indian Commerce Clause authority.39 
The court soundly disagreed, citing prominent case law establishing the 
government’s constitutional “plenary and exclusive” power with respect 
to the tribes through both the Indian Commerce Clause and Treaty 
power.40 The court held that unlike in Interstate Commerce Clause, the 
Indian Commerce clause contained no interstate limitation.41 Instead, “the 
Indian Commerce Clause vest[ed] Congress with plenary power over 
Indian Tribes and that this power [was] not delimited by state 
boundaries.”42 The court further held that acquisition of land for Indian use 
was squarely within Congress’s power to regulate commerce under the 
Indian Commerce Clause, even where it divested the State of jurisdiction 
over the land.43  
 Plaintiffs next argued that even where the Indian Commerce 
Clause authorized land-into-trust determinations, underlying principles of 
state sovereignty precluded the land-into-trust decision.44 While principles 
of state sovereignty impose some limits on federal authority over tribes, 
the court held that those limits were not triggered here.45 Rather, the court 
held that the federal government retained the power to oust state 
jurisdiction over the newly Tribe-entrusted lands.46  
 Finally, Plaintiffs argued that under the Enclave Clause the federal 
government had to obtain express State consent before taking land into 
trust for the Tribe.47 The court again disagreed, finding that consent was 
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not required because the federal government did not assert exclusive 
jurisdiction over the lands formerly under state jurisdiction.48 Here, the 
court held that federal jurisdiction was not exclusive because the Tribe, 
and to a limited extent, the State, retained some criminal and civil 
jurisdiction over the entrusted lands.49 The court ultimately held that, 
“because federal and Indian authority d[id] not wholly displace state 
authority over land taken into trust pursuant to § 5 of the IRA, the Enclave 
Clause pose[d] no barrier” to land-into-trust determinations.50  
 
C.  Tribe’s Eligibility for Land-into-Trust Procedures 
  
 Plaintiffs next challenged the DOI’s interpretation of the terms 
“Indians” and “tribe,” arguing that the Tribe was not eligible for land-into-
trust determinations, because the Tribe did not meet the definitional 
requirements under the IRA or ILCA.51 The court disagreed and held that 
the Tribe indisputably qualified as a “tribe” under the IRA and ILCA, 
because it was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.52 Thus, the federal 
government did not overstep its statutory authority by entrusting the land 
on behalf of the Tribe.53 
 The IRA defines “Indians” as “all persons of Indian descent who 
are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal 
jurisdiction.”54 It defines “tribes” as “any Indian tribe, organized band, 
pueblo or the Indians residing on one reservation.”55 Plaintiffs argued that 
the IRA’s purpose was to restore Indian lands lost under the Dawes or 
Allotment Act, whereas here, the Tribe lost its lands through illicit sales 
to the State. The court rejected this argument, noting that the IRA’s 
definition of “Indians” was unambiguously far-reaching and permitted the 
federal government to entrust land unaffected by the Dawes Act.56 
 In the alternative, Plaintiffs argued that the Tribe’s IRA opt-out 
vote was still valid because the ILCA only overrode opt-out votes of 
“tribes” for which the federal government held lands in trust.57 The ILCA, 
under § 2201(1), defines “tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, group, pueblo, 
or community for which, or for the members of which, the United States 
holds lands in trust.”58 Plaintiffs argued that the Tribe did not meet ILCA’s 
definition of “tribe,” and thus did not have restored IRA land-into-trust 
eligibility because the federal government held no land in trust for the 
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Tribe at the time of the land-into-trust determination in 2008.59 The court 
again disagreed with Plaintiffs’ analysis.60  
 The court relied heavily upon the term “community” as well as the 
ILCA’s broad remedial purpose to find that the ILCA’s definition was 
even broader than the IRA’s. The definition included the Tribe and 
restored the Tribe’s land-into-trust eligibility.61 The IRA authorized the 
federal government to take land into trust where the Tribe is a recognized 
Indian tribe.62 The court held that because the Tribe was within the ILCA’s 
definition of “tribe,” the Tribe had restored land-into-trust eligibility under 
the IRA. Since the Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934, the federal 
government had statutory authority to entrust land on behalf of the Tribe.63 
  
D.  Authority of Tribal Leadership 
  
 Plaintiffs finally challenged the federal government’s land-into-
trust decision based on alleged illegitimate Tribal leadership.64 However, 
Plaintiffs did not explain how this argument was relevant, because they 
did not challeng the validity of the Tribe’s land-into-trust request. Even if 
they had, the court held the federal courts lacked “authority to resolve 
internal disputes about tribal law.”65 The court ended its inquiry there, 
affirming the federal governments plenary power to entrust land on behalf 
of the Tribe.66 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc. v. United States represents an 
important win for Indian tribes across the United States in that it represents 
a template for tribes seeking to restore tribal homelands under the IRA. 
The case reaffirms that the federal government’s plenary power over the 
tribes is broad. Despite resulting conflicts between states and tribes over 
jurisdiction, state sovereignty claims do not upset the federal 
government’s plenary power to take lands into trust on behalf of the tribes 
under the IRA.  
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